Like anyone who wants to know where our economy is going, I’ve been scouring the economics news more than usual of late. It’s confusing stuff. Market pros typically say the Fed under its newish chairman Ben Bernanke isn’t doing enough to lower interest rates. People who don’t make their living in the markets tend to point out that it’s not Bernanke’s job to bail out investors who made stupid investments. A third layer of complexity is what, if anything, the administrative and legislative branches should be doing to help in the form of stimulus measures (spending more money, lowering taxes, or both).

The single best article I’ve read recently to make sense of it all is Sunday’s cover story in the New York Times Magazine: “The Education of Ben Bernanke,” by the great Roger Lowenstein. Perhaps with the exception of my colleague Allan Sloan, there isn’t anyone in America who writes as clearly about the complexity of economics as Lowenstein. Over Christmas I read (I’m ashamed to say, for the first time) his “When Genius Failed,” an absolute must read to understand what the mortgage crisis of 2007 does and doesn’t have in common with the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998.

Taking advantage of his three, count them, three interviews with Bernanke, Lowenstein does an outstanding job of explaining the history of the Federal Reserve, how Bernanke is different from his predeccesor, Alan Greenspan, and how the current crisis unfolded. I’ve been baffled that Bernanke failed to see the problem of the mortgage meltdown sooner, and in the article I found a clue. In his teachings at Princeton, Bernanke became if not a fan, then at least a consumer of econometrics, the study of the economy as it is reflected in the economics data published by the government and others. Greenspan, in comparison, is far more anecdotal and driven by hunches. Had Bernanke paid more attention to anecdotes about how out of the control the mortgage situation was he might have caught on more quickly.

Finally, a small-C criticism of Lowenstein’s article, and not just that it twice misspells Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s surname. Fine as it is by way of explanation, Lowenstein, at least to my read, never offers up a suggestion as to what Bernanke, the president and Congress ought to be doing. Immediately after finishing the article, I caught up with a Saturday editorial in the Wall Street Journal I found far more helpful in this regard. It’s called “The Panic Stage,” and here’s the kicker:

So what to do? Pass a tax cut that is immediate, marginal and permanent. In the “stimulus” grab bag that President Bush is contemplating, the only growth driver is bonus depreciation. Congress will be worse. As for the Fed, continue with the regulatory triage, but ease as little as it can get away with and slowly restore the monetary credibility that was so painfully earned in the 1980s.

This recipe may or may not prevent a recession, though we’d note that so far the underlying economic indicators suggest slower growth rather than a contraction. What these policies would do is prevent today’s panic from becoming something much worse.

This short and punchy editorial, together with Lowenstein’s leisurely and masterly narrative, will bring you up to speed on the economy. For now.

I’ve written a handful of times in the past year about signs of a green backlash and a bubble in alternative-energy investments. I’m not one of those global-warming deniers, though. Nor do I think reducing carbon emissions is a waste of time and money. (After all, I spent oodles of time co-writing generally favorable articles about ethanol in 2006 and Al Gore in 2007.) I just know a good old-fashioned investment bubble when I see it. A smart idea first attracts true believers, then clever opportunists, then momentum investors and finally the rubes who invest their money at the top of the cycle. Bubbles are productive, by the way, as they usually lead to positive change. You just don’t want to be the investor left holding the bag.

I gained more confidence in my thesis this week when I learned that Firsthand Funds, a San Jose, Calif.-based mutual fund company, has started a new Alternative Energy Fund (ALTEX). Firsthand is a near-perfect bubble indicator. It’s run by a smart guy named Kevin Landis who has been particularly adept over the years at starting new funds and attracting new investors to them.

Three important disclosures. First, Kevin’s a nice guy who, back when I started covering stocks in Silicon Valley, was always generous to me with his time — though media exposure, of course, is central to the mutual-fund game of attracting more assets and collecting more fees. Second, Kevin’s performance, especially at his only big fund, the Technology Value Fund (TVFQX), hasn’t been half bad. Its 15.3 percent annualized return since its inception in 1994 has trounced the 10.8 percent performance in the same time frame of the Nasdaq composite index. As you can see here, its 1-, 3-, and 5-year performance has been great too. Only Tech Value’s 10-year numbers stink. Which leads to my third important disclosure: I bought into the fund in 2000, when its net asset value per share was twice what it is now. I’ve hung onto the investment as a reminder of the perils of buying a hot sector fund.

The Firsthand Funds lesson, though, isn’t so much about Tech Value, which at $300-some million in assets is a shell of its formerly hyped self. It’s in the other funds Landis has started along the way. Importantly, it’s also about when he started them. The Global Technology Fund, for example, launched in Sept. 2000. Ooops. It has had good years and bad, but it’s down overall and has just $13 million in it. Similarly, the e-Commerce Fund looks great if you’ve owned it for five years. If you bought when it began in Sept. 1999? Not so much.

Which gets us back to the new alternative energy fund. Landis started it in October. This week he disclosed its top holdings include the likes of Applied Materials (AMAT), Corning (GLW) and Suntech Power (STP). (Corning is a top holding in two other Firsthand Funds, which is how you know Landis really likes it.)

What’s funny about all this is that Landis always billed himself as an expert in information technology, which is why investors should trust his, ahem, first-hand knowledge. In this regard he’s no different than the scores of other Silicon Valley professionals who are busy re-branding themselves as alternative-energy experts. (Landis has help in this fund, by the way, who presumably have first-hand knowledge of their own. They are the noted investors Audubon, Defenders of Wildlife, National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club and World Resources Institute.)

Will the new fund do well? Who knows. Is this a time when everyone and their sister are investing in alternative energy? Sure feels like it. Has Kevin Landis called a top in a market again by starting a new fund? That’s what potential investors will need to judge for themselves.

Fittingly for the day of the Iowa caucuses – a day when presidential wannabes pay obeisance for the last time of the year to the ethanol gods – a high-profile renewable energy company announced a setback.

Imperium Renewables, a Seattle company founded by a former executive at Microsoft (MSFT), the noted energy company, withdrew its plans for an IPO, citing poor “market conditions.” The company didn’t elaborate on just what market conditions it referred to. But clearly it’s not the market for IPOs. NetSuite (N), despite early criticism from ill-informed pundits, proved that the market always is receptive to the right kind of IPOs. No, the market conditions Imperium must mean are the markets for alternative fuels, like ethanol and biodiesel, Imperium’s particular blend of non-petroleum elixir.

Imperium had hoped to raise $345 million, which would add to the gusher of money flowing into ethanol and other alt-fuel projects. (Reuters has lots of good details in its dispatch on the withdrawal.)

It’s been clear for some time now that the renewable fuels investment craze is a classic bubble. That’s not to say ethanol and biodiesel make no sense. They do make sense at some scale and over some time period. But it means that not every project makes sense and that a whole lot of investors will lose plenty of money.

For Imperium’s part, it had intended to use $240 million for three additional biodiesel plants. One wonders if the market conditions will be right for those either.

In a contentious debate the fun begins when one side or the other starts slinging mud to confuse people. It has started in the battle over taxation of “carried interest,” otherwise cast as whether partners in investment partnerships ought to be paying a higher tax rate. (In an earlier post, Tax the Rich, I provide links to a handful of other articles that review the “Blackstone (BX) tax” fairly thoroughly.)

The obfuscation began this week in response to a bill filed last week in the House by Rep. Sander Levin that would remove the capital-gains treatment for carried interest, which is the portion of profits that private-equity partnerships take when they distribute winnings to their investors. Opponents of this proposal cleverly, but disingenuously, are trying to frame the debate as Congress trying to raise the rates on ALL capital gains. The Wall Street Journal has a good round-up today, and here are the money quotes, deep in the article:

In the House, bill opponents are being marshaled by Rep. Eric Cantor (R., Va.), a member of Mr. Rangel’s tax-writing committee and a big recipient of campaign support from the financial-services industry. He hopes to portray the legislation as the first step by Democrats toward repealing the 15% rates on capital gains and dividends.

“I don’t think people realize how much this has become a proxy fight for the 15% capital-gains rate itself,” said David Hirschmann, the president of the capital-markets division of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. Cantor, who is the top vote-counter for Republicans in the House, could win votes from most Republican lawmakers if he successfully defines the issue as a fight over the capital-gains rate, which the Republican-controlled Congress approved and Mr. Bush signed into law in 2003.

See, the interesting thing here is that neither Levin nor anyone else who is looking at this issue has said anything about changing the capital gains rate. They’re only looking at changing how carried interest is taxed.

Economist and TV personality Larry Kudlow posted a similarly dishonest article at the National Review Online in which he said that raising the tax rate on “risk capital” is just the first step toward eliminating the preferential treatment for capital gains altogether.

In his efforts at confusing people, Kudlow at least has put his finger on the issue with the expression he has fabricated, risk capital. Private equity shops, which include venture capital firms, argue that the profits their partners make years after they make an investment should be considered a capital gain because they’ve taken a risk. In fact, the risk is in reputation and time only, not capital. (If they do invest capital, nobody is arguing that shouldn’t be subject to capital-gains treatment.) At issue is how to tax the money they make if their investments — with other people’s money — pan out. The obvious answer: the same tax rate other rich people pay when they make money, 35%.

In an editorial this week, the New York Times summed up the reasoning for this change:

With income inequality surging along with the need for tax revenue, the bills’ supporters rightly conclude that it is untenable for the most highly paid Americans to enjoy tax rates that are lower than those of all but the lowest-income workers.

Confusing sloganeering aside, the issue is really that simple.

It’s almost comical the amount of money that keeps getting invested in ethanol. I’ve commented on this before, how despite the weak performance of the existing crop of ethanol companies, like VeraSun (VSE), Aventine, (AVR) and Pacific Ethanol (PEIX) investors keep pouring in more money. The latest example: the tepid showing of BioFuel Energy (BIOF), which lowered its offering range from as high as $18 before going public last week at $10.50, where the stock has pretty much stayed. Unlike the others, BioFuel hasn’t even built any plants yet, though it does have a tight tie-up with privately held power Cargill.

On Thursday, a California company called AltraBiofuels announced that it had raised $165.5 million in debt to build more ethanol plants. Last week the Wall Street Journal ran a curious article speculating on ethanol-industry consolidation. I say curious because there doesn’t seem to be any evidence, only wishful thinking of the inevitable.

This is, of course, how bubbles work. They expand and expand well beyond where the pundits expect. Then they pop. This one will too.